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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RuLE 16-DEFINITION OF IssuES 
BY THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE-Plaintiff instituted a civil antitrust suit against 
defendant in 1956. After numerous pre-trial conferences, the parties 
reached agreement as to the definition of only some of the issues.1 On 
other issues, however, the parties tendered different versions and were un-
able to reach an agreement. In a progress memorandum, the court issued 
a pre-trial order adopting defendant's version of the issues and rejecting 
the version proposed by plaintiff. The court reasoned that, under Federal 
Rule 16,2 it has the authority to adopt the formulation of issues proposed 
by one of the parties even though the other party is not in complete agree-
ment with that formulation. Life Music, Inc. v. Bmadcast Music, Inc., 81 
F.R.D. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).3 
1 The process of issue definition in the principal case involved two separate ideas. 
On the one hand, the judge eliminated factual issues about which there was no actual 
controversy between the parties. An example of this was the treatment of plaintiff's 
Issue No. 2(e), which raised the issue of ownership of radio stations by some of the 
defendants. Principal case at 15. The judge eliminated this subsection on the ground 
that it was not a "real issue," because ownership was not disputed by the defendants. 
On the other hand, there were certain matters which both parties agreed were in con-
troversy, but they were unable to agree on a specific statement of the points of con-
troversy. For example, the judge eliminated plaintiff's Issue No. 2(1), because it raised 
the issue of ownership of stock which had been previously included in more general 
terms in Issue No. 2(c), to which both parties had agreed and which was thus accepted 
as the proper statement of the issue. Principal case at 16. 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 16: "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the at• 
tomeys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider (1) The simpli• 
ti.cation of the issues • • • • The court shall make an order • • • which limits the 
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel: and 
such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified 
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.'' 
8 See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 383 (1962). 
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One of the principal functions of Federal Rule 16 is to encourage 
the parties to formulate the issues for trial, so the court may then enter 
an order stating the issues.4 Formulation of issues, which most authorities 
in the field of federal civil procedure regard as essential in a protracted 
case,11 serves two major purposes at the pre-trial level. First, it furnishes 
the pre-trial judge with a basis for limiting the parties' discovery. Under 
Federal Rule 26(b) the parties may examine any material, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the "subject matter in the pending action."6 Although 
some courts have held that the test is one of relevancy to the "subject 
matter" of the suit,7 others have indicated that the issues presented by the 
pleadings alone determine the permissible bounds of discovery.8 Conse-
quently, issue definition may be an important step in establishing criteria 
for determining the relevancy of a particular inquiry.9 This is especially 
true in protracted litigation such as the "big" antitrust case.10 Secondly, 
the pre-trial formulation of issues aids the parties in preparing for trial. 
By having the issues precisely defined, the parties can more easily deter-
mine the evidence and arguments that must be presented, and can avoid 
preparation on spurious issues.11 Moreover, the time required for the actual 
trial may be shortened considerably by the deletion of extraneous matter, 
with a resulting reduction in expense for both parties. In addition, the 
trial court will obviously benefit from pre-trial issue formulation-for ex-
ample, by the reduction of the burden of determining the relevancy, and 
thus admissibility, of evidence. In spite of these benefits, there is some 
cause for the parties' reluctance to have the issues clearly stated. This is 
particularly true of the plaintiff, who usually prefers to have unlimited 
discovery, hoping to discover unexpected material if unrestricted in the 
scope of his investigations.12 Furthermore, by harassing the defendant with 
requests for discovery, the plaintiff may enhance his position in settlement 
negotiations, even though his case is actually weak.13 
It is apparent that a solution to the problem raised in the principal 
case-judicial definition of the issues when the parties refuse to do so of 
4 Owen v. Schwartz, 177 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
II E.g., Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, Hand-
book of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 
(1960); Judicial Conference of the United States, Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other 
Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951). 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). The court may enforce this rule under its power pursuant to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b) & (d) to enter an order limiting the scope of examination. 
7 Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 11 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Heiner v. North 
Am. Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 63 (W.D. Pa. 1942). 
8 E.g., Prosperity Co. v. St. Joe Machs., Inc., 2 F.R.D. 299 (W.D. Mich. 1942). 
9 Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 5, at 67-68. 
10 Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, supra 
note 5, at 386. 
11 See Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1958). 
12 Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, supra 
note 5, at 388. 
13 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 26.02[3], at 1037 (2d ed. 1948). 
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their own accord-must be found. It has been suggested in this context 
that the judge should take the initiative14 and actually be a participant 
in the process of clarifying and limiting the issues.15 At the same time, 
it seems to be assumed that the final order stating the issues will be a 
result of agreement between the parties. Existing authority is unclear as 
to exactly how much power the judge has to force a pre-trial definition of 
issues when the parties cannot agree. Professor Moore states that a court 
should not impose its own view of the issues upon the parties;16 however, 
only one case can be cited to support this proposition, and that only in-
directly.17 There was, however, some indication prior to the principal case 
that courts were tending to assume a larger role in the definition of issues.18 
Illustrative of this trend is Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co.,19 in 
which the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss when plaintiff failed 
to comply with a pre-trial order to particularize the issues. This was not 
a defining of issues by the court, but rather a means of forcing the parties 
to define the issues themselves under Federal Rule 4l(b).20 Although this 
case did not involve the operation of Rule 16, it exemplifies the general 
philosophy that a judge does have the power to participate actively in the 
formulation of issues. The first and only decision, prior to the principal 
case, in which the court actually entered a pre-trial order defining the 
issues without complete agreement of the parties,21 was Brinn v. Bull In-
sular Lines, Inc.22 The judge had entered a pre-trial order defining the 
issues which stated that the definition had been obtained by agreement 
of the parties. Subsequently, the defendant moved to amend the pre-trial 
order to include the issue of contributory negligence, claiming that he had 
not intended to admit liability as stated therein.23 The amendment was 
denied on the ground that there was no evidence to support the issue, and 
the court decided instead to delete the phrase "by agreement" from the 
original order. This seems to indicate that the court felt that it had the 
power to define the issues absent complete agreement of the parties. 
It would appear that the concept of judicial participation in issue for-
mulation espoused by Brinn and the principal case is well-suited to achiev-
14 Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MrcH. L. REv. 
215 (1937). • 
15 Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted Litigation, supra 
note 5, at 388. 
16 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 13, ~16.11, at 1116. 
17 Padovani v. Brochhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961). 
18 See Bromley, Judicial Control of Anti-Trust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417 (1959). 
10 164 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Wis. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1959). 
20 FED. R. Crv. P. 4l(b), which gives the judge the power to dismiss the complaint 
for plaintiff's failure to comply with any orders of the court. 
21 But see Note, 72 YALE L.J. 383, 385 (1962), which expresses the opinion that Brinn 
is considerably weakened as precedent for the proposition that a judge may define the 
issues without complete agreement of the parties, because the parties had reached ap-
parent agreement prior to the issuance of the pre-trial order. 
22 28 F.R.D. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
23 The pre-trial order stated that the parties had agreed on the existence of lia-
bility and only a question of remedy remained. 
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ing the purposes of Rule 16. The desirability of these purposes seems to 
lead to the conclusion that unilateral formulation of the issues by the 
judge might be proper in cases where the parties fail to agree. The opinion 
in the principal case suggested that the pre-trial judge has the power to 
do so, although it was unnecessary in this instance.24 One of the prime rea-
sons for not allowing such a broad power is the lack of restrictions to pre-
vent an arbitrary formulation. Rule 16 contains no express limitations on 
the judge's powar in drawing up the pre-trial order. Thus, restrictions must 
be self-imposed by the judiciary. In the principal case, for example, the 
court limited itself to adopting defendant's version of the issues because 
it found the parties in substantial agreement and sought to build upon 
that accord.25 A second reason for not allowing such an unfettered power 
is that there will ordinarily be no review of such an order available before 
a decision on the merits, because a pre-trial order is generally not regarded 
as a final judgment,26 and review, with the exception of an interlocutory 
appeal, is limited to final judgments.27 Subsequent to the issuance of the 
pre-trial order, the plaintiff in the principal case petitioned for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the judge to add plaintiff's version of the issues to 
the order.28 In a short opinion the court of appeals stated that formal 
assent of the parties was not necessary for the definition of issues if the 
judge found that they were in basic agreement, thus indicating that the 
appellate court approves of the reasoning in the principal case. The court 
then denied the writ on the basis of a federal policy against interlocutory 
appeals at the pre-trial stage. Because the parties are usually denied appeal 
until the final judgment, they run the risk of having the court of appeals 
find the lower court's formulation of the issues erroneous. Therefore, a 
long and expensive trial may go for naught, and the parties may face the 
delay and expense of a new trial on only slightly different issues. A new 
trial also means an additional burden on the federal district courts-swell-
ing their already crowded dockets. 
The aforementioned problems demonstrate the need for some safe-
guards if there is to be a practicable means by which the judge can break 
a deadlock in the definition of issues. One such safeguard inherent in the 
system is the general high quality of the federal bench. This is one of 
the best possible guarantees against judicial arbitrariness in the definition 
of issues. Although even a qualified jurist may err, Rule 16 allows him to 
modify the pre-trial order during the trial if it appears that there will be 
"manifest injustice" if it is not changed.29 Perhaps this will be sufficient 
to prevent any miscarriage of justice. It would probably be better, how-
24 Principal case at 8. 
25 Ibid. 
26 3 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 13, 11 16.21, at 1132. 
27 Interlocutory Appeals Act, 72 Stat. 1770 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958); See 3 MooRE, 
op, cit. supra note 13, 11 16.21, at 1132. 
28 Life Music, Inc. v. Edelstein, 309 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1962). 
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
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ever, to revamp Rule 16 to include express limitations on this new-found 
power, rather than to rely solely on the high quality of the bench to pre-
vent its misuse. One such limitation might involve restricting the judge 
to accepting the formulation of one or the other of the parties, as was done 
in the principal case. It is possible that this solution would cause additional 
problems if the parties were far from agreement and each position had 
some merit. A variation of the limitation suggested might provide a more 
appropriate solution. Rather than requiring the judge to accept one of 
the formulations in toto, he might be permitted to select the portions of 
each which he considers as correctly defining the issues and combine them 
in his pre-trial order. Such a limitation should not unduly hinder the 
court, and at the same time would be more compatible with an adversary 
system than unilateral formulation of the issues by the judge. 
F. Bruce Kulp, Jr. 
